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Abstract 
The outbreak of coronavirus named COVID-19 has disrupted the Chinese economy 
and is spreading globally. The evolution of the disease and its economic impact is 
highly uncertain which makes it difficult for policymakers to formulate an appropriate 
macroeconomic policy response. In order to better understand possible economic 
outcomes, this paper explores seven different scenarios of how COVID-19 might 
evolve in the coming year using a modelling technique developed by Lee and McKibbin 
(2003) and extended by McKibbin and Sidorenko (2006). It examines the impacts of 
different scenarios on macroeconomic outcomes and financial markets in a global 
hybrid DSGE/CGE general equilibrium model. 
The scenarios in this paper demonstrate that even a contained outbreak could 
significantly impact the global economy in the short run. These scenarios demonstrate 
the scale of costs that might be avoided by greater investment in public health systems 
in all economies but particularly in less developed economies where health care 
systems are less developed and popultion density is high. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The COVID-19 outbreak (previously 2019-nCoV) was caused by the SARS-CoV-2 virus. This 
outbreak was triggered in December 2019 in Wuhan city  in Hubei province of China. COVID-
19 continues to spread across the world. Initially the epicenter of the outbreak was China with 
reported cases either in China or being travelers from China. At the time of writing this paper, 
at least four further epicenters have been identified: Iran, Italy, Japan and South Korea. Even 
though the cases reported from China are expected to have peaked and are now falling (WHO 
2020), cases reported from countries previously thought to be resilient to the outbreak, due to 
stronger medical standards and practices, have recently increased. While some countries have 
been able to effectively treat reported cases, it is uncertain where and when new cases will 
emerge. Amidst the significant public health risk COVID-19 poses to the world, the World 
Health Organization (WHO) has declared a public health emergency of international concern 
to coordinate international responses to the disease. It is, however, currently debated whether 
COVID-19 could potentially escalate to a global pandemic. 
In a strongly connected and integrated world, the impacts of the disease beyond mortality (those 
who die) and morbidity (those who are incapacitated or caring for the incapacitated and unable 
to work for a period) has become apparent since the outbreak. Amidst the slowing down of the 
Chinese economy with interruptions to production, the functioning of global supply chains has 
been disrupted. Companies across the world, irrespective of size, dependent upon inputs from 
China have started experiencing contractions in production. Transport being limited and even 
restricted among countries has further slowed down global economic activities. Most 
importantly, some panic among consumers and firms has distorted usual consumption patterns 
and created market anomalies. Global financial markets have also been responsive to the 
changes and global stock indices have plunged. Amidst the global turbulence, in an initial 
assessment, the International Monetary Fund expects China to slow down by 0.4 percentage 
points compared to its initial growth target to 5.6 percent, also slowing down global growth by 
0.1 percentage points. This is likely to be revised in coming weeks4. 
                                                          
 
4 See OECD(2020) for an updated announcement 
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This paper attempts to quantify the potential global economic costs of COVID-19 under 
different possible scenarios. The goal is to provide guidance to policy makers to the economic 
benefits of globally-coordinated policy responses to tame the virus. The paper builds upon the 
experience gained from evaluating the economics of SARS (Lee & McKibbin 2003) and 
Pandemic Influenza (McKibbin & Sidorenko 2006). The paper first summarizes the existing 
literature on the macroeconomic costs of diseases. Section 3 outlines the global macroeconomic 
model (G-Cubed) used for the study, highlighting its strengths to assess the macroeconomics 
of diseases. Section 4 describes how epidemiological information is adjusted to formulate a 
series of economic shocks that are input into the global economic model. Section 5 discusses 
the results of the seven scenarios simulated using the model. Section 6 concludes the paper 
summarizing the main findings and discusses some policy implications. 
2. Related Literature 
Many studies have found that population health, as measured by life expectancy, infant and 
child mortality and maternal mortality, is positively related to economic welfare and growth 
(Pritchett and Summers, 1996; Bloom and Sachs, 1998; Bhargava and et al., 2001; Cuddington 
et al., 1994; Cuddington and Hancock, 1994; Robalino et al., 2002a; Robalino et al., 2002b; 
WHO Commission on Macroeconomics and Health, 2001; Haacker, 2004).  
There are many channels through which an infectious disease outbreak influences the economy. 
Direct and indirect economic costs of illness are often the subject of the health economics 
studies on the burden of disease. The conventional approach uses information on deaths 
(mortality) and illness that prevents work (morbidity) to estimate the loss of future income due 
to death and disability. Losses of time and income by carers and direct expenditure on medical 
care and supporting services are added to obtain the estimate of the economic costs associated 
with the disease. This conventional approach underestimates the true economic costs of 
infectious diseases of epidemic proportions which are highly transmissible and for which there 
is no vaccine (e.g. HIV/AIDS, SARS and pandemic influenza). The experience from these 
previous disease outbreaks provides valuable information on how to think about the 
implications of COVID-19 
The HIV/AIDS virus affects households, businesses and governments - through changed labor 
supply decisions; efficiency of labor and household incomes;  increased business costs and 
foregone investment in staff training by firms; and increased public expenditure on health care 
and support of disabled and children orphaned by AIDS, by the public sector (Haacker, 2004). 
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The effects of AIDS are long-term but there are clear prevention measures that minimize the 
risks of acquiring HIV, and there are documented successes in implementing prevention and 
education programs, both in developed and in the developing world. Treatment is also available, 
with modern antiretroviral therapies extending the life expectancy and improving the quality 
of life of HIV patients by many years if not decades. Studies of the macroeconomic impact of 
HIV/AIDS include (Cuddington, 1993a; Cuddington, 1993b; Cuddington et al., 1994; 
Cuddington and Hancock, 1994;  Haacker, 2002a; Haacker, 2002b; Over, 2002; Freire, 2004;  
The World Bank, 2006). Several computable general equilibrium (CGE) macroeconomic 
models have been applied to study the impact of AIDS (Arndt and Lewis, 2001; Bell et al., 
2004). 
The influenza virus is by far more contagious than HIV, and the onset of an epidemic can be 
sudden and unexpected. It appears that the COVID-19 virus is also very contagious. The fear 
of 1918-19 Spanish influenza, the “deadliest plague in history,” with its extreme severity and 
gravity of clinical symptoms, is still present in the research and general community (Barry, 
2004). The fear factor was influential in the world’s response to SARS – a coronavirus not 
previously detected in humans (Shannon and Willoughby, 2004; Peiris et al., 2004). It is also 
reflected in the response to COVID-19. Entire cities in China have closed and travel restrictions 
placed by countries on people entering from infected countries. The fear of an unknown deadly 
virus is similar in its psychological effects to the reaction to biological and other terrorism 
threats and causes a high level of stress, often with longer-term consequences (Hyams et al., 
2002). A large number of people would feel at risk at the onset of a pandemic, even if their 
actual risk of dying from the disease is low. 
Individual assessment of the risks of death depends on the probability of death, years of life 
lost, and the subjective discounting factor. Viscusi et al. (1997) rank pneumonia and influenza 
as the third leading cause of the probability of death (following cardiovascular disease and 
cancer). Sunstein (1997) discusses the evidence that an individual’s willingness to pay to avoid 
death increases for causes perceived as “bad deaths” – especially dreaded, uncontrollable, 
involuntary deaths and deaths associated with high externalities and producing distributional 
inequity. Based on this literature, it is not unreasonable to assume that individual perception of 
the risks associated with the new influenza pandemic virus similar to Spanish influenza in its 
virulence and the severity of clinical symptoms can be very high, especially during the early 
stage of the pandemic when no vaccine is available and antivirals are in short supply. This is 
exactly the reaction revealed in two surveys conducted in Taiwan during the SARS outbreak 
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in 2003 (Liu et al., 2005), with the novelty, salience and public concern about SARS 
contributing to the higher than expected willingness to pay to prevent the risk of infection.  
Studies of the macroeconomic effects of the SARS epidemic in 2003 found significant effects 
on economies through large reductions in consumption of various goods and services, an 
increase in business operating costs, and re-evaluation of country risks reflected in increased 
risk premiums. Shocks to other economies were transmitted according to the degree of the 
countries’ exposure, or susceptibility, to the disease. Despite a relatively small number of cases 
and deaths, the global costs were significant and not limited to the directly affected countries 
(Lee and McKibbin, 2003). Other studies of SARS include (Chou et al., 2004) for Taiwan, (Hai 
et al., 2004) for China and (Sui and Wong, 2004) for Hong Kong. 
There are only a few studies of economic costs of large-scale outbreaks of infectious diseases 
to date:  Schoenbaum (1987) is an example of an early analysis of the economic impact of 
influenza. Meltzer et al. (1999) examine the likely economic effects of the influenza pandemic 
in the US and evaluate several vaccine-based interventions. At a gross attack rate (i.e. the 
number of people contracting the virus out of the total population) of 15-35%, the number of 
influenza deaths is 89 – 207 thousand, and an estimated mean total economic impact for the 
US economy is $73.1- $166.5 billion.  
Bloom et al. (2005) use the Oxford economic forecasting model to estimate the potential 
economic impact of a pandemic resulting from the mutation of avian influenza strain. They 
assume a mild pandemic with a 20% attack rate and a 0.5 percent case-fatality rate, and a 
consumption shock of 3%. Scenarios include two-quarters of demand contraction only in Asia 
(combined effect 2.6% Asian GDP or US$113.2 billion); a longer-term shock with a longer 
outbreak and larger shock to consumption and export yields a loss of 6.5% of GDP (US$282.7 
billion). Global GDP is reduced by 0.6%, global trade of goods and services contracts by $2.5 
trillion (14%). Open economies are more vulnerable to international shocks.  
Another study by the US Congressional Budget Office (2005) examined two scenarios of 
pandemic influenza for the United States.  A mild scenario with an attack rate of 20% and a 
case fatality rate (.i.e. the number who die relative to the number infected) of 0.1% and a more 
severe scenario with an attack rate of 30% and a case fatality rate of 2.5%. The CBO (2005) 
study finds a GDP contraction for the United States of 1.5% for the mild scenario and 5% of 
GDP for the severe scenario. 
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McKibbin and Sidorenko (2006) used an earlier vintage of the model used in the current paper 
to explore four different pandemic influenza scenarios. They considered a “mild” scenario in 
which the pandemic is similar to the 1968-69 Hong Kong Flu; a “moderate” scenario which is 
similar to the Asian flu of 1957; a “severe” scenario based on the Spanish flu of 1918-1919 
((lower estimate of the case fatality rate), and an “ultra” scenario similar to Spanish flu 1918-
19 but with upper-middle estimates of the case fatality rate. They found costs to the global 
economy of between $US300 million and $US4.4trillion dollars for the scenarios considered. 
The current paper modifies and extends that earlier papers by Lee and McKibbin (2003) and 
McKibbin and Sidorenko (2006) to a larger group of countries, using updated data that captures 
the greater interdependence in the world economy and in particular, the rise of China’s 
importance in the world economy today.  
 
3. The Hybrid DSGE/CGE Global Model 
For this paper, we apply a global intertemporal general equilibrium model with heterogeneous 
agents called the G-Cubed Multi-Country Model. This model is a hybrid of Dynamic Stochastic 
General Equilibrium (DSGE) Models and Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) Models 
developed by McKibbin and Wilcoxen (1999, 2013)  
(9) The G-Cubed Model 
The version of the G-Cubed (G20) model used in this paper can be found in McKibbin and 
Triggs (2018) who extended the original model documented in McKibbin and Wilcoxen (1999, 
2013). The model has 6 sectors and 24 countries and regions. Table 1 presents all the regions 
and sectors in the model. Some of the data inputs include the I/O tables found in the Global 
Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) database (Aguiar et al. 2019), which enables us to differentiate 
sectors by country of production within a DSGE framework. Each sector in each country has a 
KLEM technology in production which captures the primary factor inputs of capital (K) and 
labor (L) as well as the intermediate or production chains of inputs in energy (E) and materials 
inputs (M). These linkages are both within a country and across countries. 
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Table 1 – Overview of the G-Cubed (G20) model 
Countries (20) Regions (4) 
Argentina Rest of the OECD 
Australia Rest of Asia 
Brazil Other oil-producing countries 
Canada Rest of the world 
China  
Rest of Eurozone Sectors (6) 
France Energy 
Germany Mining 
Indonesia Agriculture (including fishing and hunting) 
India Durable manufacturing 
Italy Non-durable manufacturing 
Japan Services 
Korea  
Mexico Economic Agents in each Country (3) 
Russia A representative household 
Saudi Arabia A representative firm (in each of the 6 production sectors) 
South Africa  Government 
Turkey  
United Kingdom  
United States  
 
The approach embodied in the G-Cubed model is documented in McKibbin and Wilcoxen 
(1998, 2013). Several key features of the standard G-Cubed model are worth highlighting here.  
First, the model completely accounts for stocks and flows of physical and financial assets. For 
example, budget deficits accumulate into government debt, and current account deficits 
accumulate into foreign debt. The model imposes an intertemporal budget constraint on all 
households, firms, governments, and countries. Thus, a long-run stock equilibrium obtains 
through the adjustment of asset prices, such as the interest rate for government fiscal positions 
or real exchange rates for the balance of payments. However, the adjustment towards the long-
run equilibrium of each economy can be slow, occurring over much of a century.  
Second, firms and households in G-Cubed must use money issued by central banks for all 
transactions. Thus, central banks in the model set short term nominal interest rates to target 
macroeconomic outcomes (such as inflation, unemployment, exchange rates, etc.) based on 
Henderson-McKibbin-Taylor monetary rules. These rules are designed to approximate actual 
monetary regimes in each country or region in the model.  These monetary rules tie down the 
long-run inflation rates in each country as well as allowing short term adjustment of policy to 
smooth fluctuations in the real economy. 
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Third, nominal wages are sticky and adjust over time based on country-specific labor 
contracting assumptions. Firms hire labor in each sector up to the points that the marginal 
product of labor equals the real wage defined in terms of the output price level of that sector. 
Any excess labor enters the unemployed pool of workers. Unemployment or the presence of 
excess demand for labor causes the nominal wage to adjust to clear the labor market in the long 
run. In the short-run, unemployment can arise due to structural supply shocks or changes in 
aggregate demand in the economy.  
Fourth, rigidities prevent the economy from moving quickly from one equilibrium to another. 
These rigidities include nominal stickiness caused by wage rigidities, lack of complete 
foresight in the formation of expectations, cost of adjustment in investment by firms with 
physical capital being sector-specific in the short run, monetary and fiscal authorities following 
particular monetary and fiscal rules. Short term adjustment to economic shocks can be very 
different from the long-run equilibrium outcomes. The focus on short-run rigidities is important 
for assessing the impact over the initial decades of demographic change.  
Fifth, we incorporate heterogeneous households and firms. Firms are modeled separately 
within each sector. There is a mixture of two types of consumers and two types of firms within 
each sector, within each country: one group which bases its decisions on forward-looking 
expectations and the other group which follows simpler rules of thumb which are optimal in 
the long run. 
4. Modeling epidemiological scenarios in an economic model 
 
We follow the approach in Lee and McKibbin (2003) and McKibbin and Sidorenko (2006) to 
convert different assumptions about mortality rates and morbidity rates in the country where 
the disease outbreak occurs (the epicenter country). Given the epidemiological assumptions 
based on previous experience of pandemics, we create a set of filters that convert the shocks 
into economic shocks to reduced labor supply in each country (mortality and morbidity); rising 
cost of doing business in each sector including disruption of production networks in each 
country; consumption reduction due to shifts in consumer preferences over each good from 
each country (in addition to changes generated by the model based on change in income and 
prices);  rise in equity risk premia on companies in each sector in each country (based on 
exposure to the disease); and increases in country risk premium based on exposure to the 
disease as well as vulnerabilities to changing macroeconomic conditions.  
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In the remainder of this section, we outline how the various indicators are constructed. The 
approach follows McKibbin and Sidorenko (2006) with some improvements. There are, of 
course, many assumptions in this exercise and the results are sensitive to these assumptions. 
The goal of the paper is to provide policymakers with some idea of the costs of not intervening 
and allowing the various scenarios to unfold. 
Epidemiological assumptions 
The attack rates (proportion of the entire population who become infected) and case-fatality 
rates (proportion of those infected who die) and the implied mortality rate (proportion of total 
population who die) assumed for China under seven different scenarios are contained in Table 
2 below. Each scenario is given a name. S01 is scenario 1. 
Table 2 – Epidemiological Assumptions for China 
Scenario Attack Rate for China 
Case-fatality Rate for 
China 
Mortality Rate for 
China 
S01 1% 2.0% 0.02% 
S02 10% 2.5% 0.25% 
S03 30% 3.0% 0.90% 
S04 10% 2.0% 0.20% 
S05 20% 2.5% 0.50% 
S06 30% 3.0% 0.90% 
S07 10% 2.0% 0.20% 
 
 
We explore seven scenarios based on the survey of historical pandemics in McKibbin and 
Sidorenko (2006) and the most recent data on the COVID-19 virus. Table 3 summarizes the 
scenarios for the disease outbreak. The scenarios vary by attack rate, mortality rate and the 
countries experiencing the epidemiological shocks.. Scenarios 1-3 assume the epidemiological 
events are isolated to China. The economic impact on China and the spillovers to other 
countries are through trade, capital flows and the impacts of changes in risk premia in global 
financial markets – as determined by the model. Scenarios 4-6 are the pandemic scenarios 
where the epidemiological shocks occur in all countries to differing degrees. Scenarios 1-6 
assume the shocks are temporary. Scenario 7 is a case where a mild pandemic is expected to 
be recurring each year for the indefinite future. 
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Table 3 – Scenario Assumptions 
 
 
a) Shocks to labor supply 
The shock to labor supply in each country includes three components: mortality due to infection, 
morbidity due to infection and morbidity arising from caregiving for affected family members. 
For the mortality component, a mortality rate is initially calculated using different attack rates 
and case-fatality rates for China. These attack rates and case-fatality rates are based on 
observations during SARS and following McKibbin and Sidorenko (2006) on pandemic 
influenza, as well as currently publicly available epidemiological data for COVID-19.  
We take the Chinese epidemiological assumptions and scale these for different countries. The 
scaling is done by calculating an Index of Vulnerability. This index is then applied to the 
Chinese mortality rates to generate country specific mortality rates. Countries that are more 
vulnerable than China will have higher rate of mortality and morbidity and countries who are 
less vulnerable with lower epidemiological outcomes, The Index of Vulnerability  is 
constructed by aggregating an Index of Geography and an Index of Health Policy, following 
McKibbin and Sidorenko (2006). The Index of Geography is the average of two indexes. The 
first is the urban population density of countries divided by the share of urban in total 
population. This is expressed relative to China. The second sub index is an index of openness 
to tourism relative to China. The Index of Health Policy also consists of two components: the 
Global Health Security Index and Health Expenditure per Capita relative to China. The Global 
Health Security Index assigns scores to countries according to six criteria, which includes the 
ability to prevent, detect and respond to epidemics (see GHSIndex 2020). The Index of 
Geography and Index of Health Policy for different countries are presented in Figures 1 and 2, 
Scen
ario 
  
Countries 
Affected 
 
Seve
rity 
 
Attack Rate 
for China 
 
Case fatality 
rate China 
 
Nature of 
Shocks 
 
Shocks 
Activated 
Shocks 
Activated 
China Other countries 
1 China Low 1.0% 2.0% Temporary All Risk 
2 China Mid 10.0% 2.5% Temporary All Risk 
3 China High 30.0% 3.0% Temporary All Risk 
4 Global Low 10.0% 2.0% Temporary All All 
5 Global Mid 20.0% 2.5% Temporary All All 
6 Global High 30.0% 3.0% Temporary All All 
7 Global Low  10.0% 2.0% Permanent All All 
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respectively. The lower the value of the Index of Health Policy, the better would be a given 
country’s health standards. However, a lower value for the Index of Geography represents a 
lower risk to a given country. 
When calculating the second component of the labor shock we need to adjust for the problem 
that the model is an annual model. Days lost therefore must be annualized. The current 
recommended incubation period for COVID-19 is 14 days5, so we assume an average employee 
in a country would have to be absent from work for 14 days, if infected. Absence from work 
indicates a loss of productive capacity for 14 days out of working days for a year. Hence, we 
calculate an effective attack rate for China using the attack rate assumed for a given scenario, 
and the proportion of days absent from work and scale them across other countries using the 
Index of Vulnerability. 
The third component of the labor shock accounts for absenteeism from work due to caregiving 
family members who are infected. We assume the same effective attack rate as before and that 
around 70 percent of the female workers would be care givers to family members. We adjust 
the effective attack rate using the Index of Vulnerability and the proportion of labor force who 
have to care for school-aged children (70 percent of female labor force participation). This does 
account for school closures. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
 
5 There is evidence that this figure could be close to 21 days. This would increase the scale of the shock. 
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Table 4 contains the labor shocks for countries for different scenarios. 
Table 4 – Shocks to labor supply 
Region S01 S02 S03 S04 S05 S06 S07 
Argentina 0 0 0 -  0.65 -   1.37 -   2.14 -  0.65 
Australia 0 0 0 -   0.48 -   1.01 -   1.58 -  0.48 
Brazil 0 0 0 -   0.66 -   1.37 -   2.15 -  0.66 
Canada 0 0 0 -   0.43 -   0.89 -   1.40 -  0.43 
China -  0.10 - 1.10 - 3.44 -   1.05 -   2.19 -   3.44 -  1.05 
France 0 0 0 -   0.52 -   1.08 -   1.69 -  0.52 
Germany 0 0 0 -   0.51 -   1.06 -   1.66 -  0.51 
India 0 0 0 -   1.34 -   2.82 -   4.44 -  1.34 
Indonesia 0 0 0 -   1.39 -   2.91 -   4.56 -  1.39 
Italy 0 0 0 -   0.48 -   1.02 -   1.60 -  0.48 
Japan 0 0 0 -   0.50 -   1.04 -   1.64 -  0.50 
Mexico 0 0 0 -   0.78 -   1.64 -   2.57 -  0.78 
Republic of Korea 0 0 0 -   0.56 -   1.17 -   1.85 -  0.56 
Russia 0 0 0 -   0.71 -   1.48 -   2.31 -  0.71 
Saudi Arabia 0 0 0 -   0.41 -   0.87 -   1.37 -  0.41 
South Africa 0 0 0 -   0.80 -   1.67 -   2.61 -  0.80 
Turkey 0 0 0 -   0.76 -   1.59 -   2.50 -  0.76 
United Kingdom 0 0 0 -   0.53 -   1.12 -   1.75 -  0.53 
United States of America 0 0 0 -   0.40 -   0.83 -   1.30 -  0.40 
Other Asia 0 0 0 -  0.88 -   1.84 -   2.89 -  0.88 
Other oil producing countries 0 0 0 -  0.97 -   2.01 -   3.13 -  0.97 
Rest of Euro Zone 0 0 0 -   0.46 -   0.97 -   1.52 -  0.46 
Rest of OECD 0 0 0 -   0.43 -   0.89 -   1.39 -  0.43 
Rest of the World 0 0 0 -   1.29 -   2.67 -   4.16 -  1.29 
 
b) Shocks to the equity risk premium of economic sectors 
We assume that the announcement of the virus will cause risk premia through the world to 
change. We create risk premia  in the United States to approximate the observed initial response 
to scenario 1. We then adjust the equity risk shock to all countries across a given scenario by 
applying the indexes outlined next. We also scale the shock across scenarios by applying the 
different mortality rate assumptions across countries.   
The Equity Risk Premium shock is the aggregation of the mortality component of the labor 
shock and a Country Risk Index. The Country Risk Index is the average of three indices: Index 
of Governance Risk, Index of Financial Risk and Index of Health Policy. In developing these 
indices, we use the US as a benchmark due to the prevalence of well-developed financial 
markets there (Fisman and Love 2004). 
The Index of Governance Risk is based on the International Country Risk Guide, which assigns 
countries scores based on performance in 22 variables across three categories: political, 
economic, and financial (see PRSGroup 2020). The political variables include government 
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stability, as well as the prevalence of conflicts, corruption and the rule of law. GDP per capita, 
real GDP growth and inflation are some of the economic variables considered in the Index. 
Financial variables contained in the Index account for exchange rate stability and international 
liquidity among others. Figure 3 summarizes the scores for countries for the governance risk 
relative to the United States. 
One of the most easily available indicators of the expected global economic impacts of 
COVID-19 has been movements in financial market indices. Since the commencement of the 
outbreak, financial markets continue to respond to daily developments regarding the outbreak 
across the world. Particularly, stock markets have been demonstrating investor awareness of 
industry-specific (unsystematic) impacts. Hence, when developing the Equity Risk Premium 
Shocks for sectors, we include an Index of Financial Risk, even though it is already partially 
accounted for within the Index of Governance Risk. This higher weight on financial risk 
enables us to reproduce the prevailing turbulence in financial markets. The Index of Financial 
Risk uses the current account balance of the countries as a proportion of GDP in 2015. Figure 
4 contains the scores for the countries relative to the United States  
Even though construction of the Index of Health Policy follows the procedure described for 
developing the mortality component of the labor shock, the US has been used as the base-
country instead of China, when developing the shock on equity risk premium since the US is 
the center of the global financial system and in the model, all risks are defined relative to the 
US. Figure 5 contains the scores for the countries for the Index of Health Policy relative to the 
United States. 
The Net Risk Index for countries is presented in Figure 6 and Shock on Equity Risk Premia for 
Scenario 4-7 are presented in Table 5. 
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Table 5 – Shock to equity risk premium for scenario 4-7 
Region S04 S05 S06 S07 
Argentina 1.90 2.07 2.30 1.90 
Australia 1.23 1.37 1.54 1.23 
Brazil 1.59 1.78 2.03 1.59 
Canada 1.23 1.36 1.52 1.23 
China 1.97 2.27 2.67 1.97 
France 1.27 1.40 1.59 1.27 
Germany 1.07 1.21 1.41 1.07 
India 2.20 2.62 3.18 2.20 
Indonesia 2.06 2.43 2.93 2.06 
Italy 1.32 1.47 1.66 1.32 
Japan 1.18 1.33 1.53 1.18 
Mexico 1.76 1.98 2.27 1.76 
Republic of Korea 1.25 1.43 1.67 1.25 
Russia 1.77 1.96 2.22 1.77 
Saudi Arabia 1.38 1.52 1.70 1.38 
South Africa 1.85 2.06 2.33 1.85 
Turkey 1.98 2.20 2.50 1.98 
United Kingdom 1.35 1.50 1.70 1.35 
United States of America 1.07 1.18 1.33 1.07 
Other Asia 1.51 1.75 2.07 1.51 
Other oil-producing countries 2.03 2.25 2.55 2.03 
Rest of Euro Zone 1.29 1.42 1.60 1.29 
Rest of OECD 1.11 1.22 1.38 1.11 
Rest of the World 2.21 2.51 2.91 2.21 
 
 
c) Shocks to the cost of production in each sector 
As well as the shock to labor inputs, we identify that other inputs such as Trade, Land Transport, 
Air Transport and Sea Transport have been significantly affected by the outbreak. Thus, we 
calculate the share of inputs from these exposed sectors to the six aggregated sectors of the 
model and compare the contribution relative to China. We then benchmark the percentage 
increase in the cost of production in Chinese production sectors during SARS to the first 
scenario and scale the percentage across scenarios to match the changes in the mortality 
component of the labor shock. Variable shares of inputs from exposed sectors to aggregated 
economic sectors also allow us to vary the shock across sectors in the countries. Table 6 
contains the shocks to the cost of production in each sector in each country due to the share of 
inputs from exposed sectors. 
a) Shocks to consumption demand 
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The G-Cubed model endogenously changes spending patterns in response to changes in income, 
wealth, and relative price changes. However, independent of these variables, during an 
outbreak, it is likely that preferences for certain activities will change with the outbreak. 
Following McKibbin and Sidorenko (2006), we assume that the reduction in spending on those 
activities will reduce the overall spending, hence saving money for future expenditure. In 
modeling this behavior, we employ a Sector Exposure Index. The Index is calculated as the 
share of exposed sectors: Trade, Land, Air & Sea Transport and Recreation, within the GDP 
of a country relative to China. The reduction in consumption expenditure during the SARS 
outbreak in China is used as the benchmark for the first scenario. The advantage is that this 
response was observed. The disadvantage is that other countries could behave differently. 
Given we don’t have observations of other epicenters start with this assumption and then adjust 
it as follows. This benchmark is then scaled across other scenarios relative to the mortality 
component of the labor shock and adjusted across countries through the different sectoral 
exposure. Figure 7 contains the Sector Exposure Indices for the countries and the shock to 
consumption demand is presented in Table 7. Note that CBO (2005) uses a shock of 3% to US 
consumption from an H5N1 influenza pandemic which is between S05 and S06 in Table 7. 
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Table 6 – Shocks to cost of production 
Region Energy Mining Agriculture 
Durable 
Manufacturi
ng 
Non-durable 
Manufacturi
ng 
Service
s 
Argentina 0.37 0.24 0.37 0.35 0.40 0.38 
Australia 0.43 0.43 0.42 0.39 0.41 0.45 
Brazil 0.44 0.46 0.44 0.42 0.45 0.44 
Canada 0.44 0.37 0.42 0.40 0.41 0.44 
China 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 
France 0.38 0.31 0.36 0.40 0.42 0.46 
Germany 0.43 0.37 0.40 0.45 0.45 0.47 
India 0.47 0.33 0.47 0.42 0.45 0.43 
Indonesia 0.37 0.33 0.31 0.36 0.40 0.38 
Italy 0.36 0.33 0.38 0.42 0.44 0.46 
Japan 0.45 0.40 0.45 0.47 0.47 0.49 
Mexico 0.41 0.38 0.39 0.42 0.42 0.41 
Other Asia 0.44 0.39 0.44 0.45 0.45 0.47 
Other oil producing 
countries 0.49 0.41 0.47 0.40 0.43 0.45 
Republic of Korea 0.39 0.30 0.37 0.43 0.42 0.43 
Rest of Euro Zone 0.42 0.41 0.43 0.43 0.46 0.48 
Rest of OECD 0.42 0.38 0.41 0.41 0.43 0.46 
Rest of the World 0.52 0.46 0.51 0.45 0.49 0.48 
Russia 0.54 0.37 0.43 0.41 0.42 0.45 
Saudi Arabia 0.32 0.25 0.29 0.29 0.25 0.35 
South Africa 0.40 0.35 0.39 0.41 0.43 0.38 
Turkey 0.37 0.36 0.39 0.39 0.42 0.42 
United Kingdom 0.39 0.37 0.39 0.39 0.42 0.46 
United States of 
America 0.53 0.40 0.51 0.50 0.51 0.53 
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Table 7 – Shocks to consumption demand 
Region S04 S05 S06 S07 
Argentina -          0.83 -          2.09 -          3.76 -          0.83 
Australia -          0.90 -          2.26 -          4.07 -          0.90 
Brazil -          0.92 -          2.31 -          4.16 -          0.92 
Canada -          0.90 -          2.26 -          4.07 -          0.90 
China -          1.00 -          2.50 -          4.50 -          1.00 
France -          0.93 -          2.31 -          4.16 -          0.93 
Germany -          0.95 -          2.36 -          4.25 -          0.95 
India -          0.91 -          2.29 -          4.11 -          0.91 
Indonesia -          0.86 -          2.15 -          3.86 -          0.86 
Italy -          0.93 -          2.32 -          4.18 -          0.93 
Japan -          1.01 -          2.51 -          4.52 -          1.01 
Mexico -          0.89 -          2.22 -          4.00 -          0.89 
Other Asia -          0.95 -          2.38 -          4.28 -          0.95 
Other oil producing countries -          0.92 -          2.31 -          4.16 -          0.92 
Republic of Korea -          0.89 -          2.23 -          4.01 -          0.89 
Rest of Euro Zone -          0.98 -          2.45 -          4.40 -          0.98 
Rest of OECD -          0.92 -          2.31 -          4.16 -          0.92 
Rest of the World -          0.98 -          2.45 -          4.42 -          0.98 
Russia -          0.92 -          2.31 -          4.16 -          0.92 
Saudi Arabia -          0.74 -          1.86 -          3.35 -          0.74 
South Africa -          0.82 -          2.05 -          3.69 -          0.82 
Turkey -          0.88 -          2.19 -          3.95 -          0.88 
United Kingdom -          0.94 -          2.34 -          4.22 -          0.94 
United States of America -          1.06 -          2.66 -          4.78 -          1.06 
 
b) Shocks to government expenditure 
With the previous experience of pandemics, governments across the world have exercised a 
stronger caution towards the outbreak by taking measures, such as strengthening health 
screening at ports and investments in strengthening healthcare infrastructure, to prevent the 
outbreak reaching additional countries. They have also responded by increasing health 
expenditures to contain the spread. In modeling these interventions by governments, we use 
the change in Chinese government expenditure relative to GDP in 2003 during the SARS 
outbreak as a benchmark and use the average of Index of Governance and Index of Health 
Policy to obtain the potential increase in government expenditure by other countries. We then 
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scale the shock across scenarios using the mortality component of the labor shock. Table 8 
demonstrates the magnitude of the government expenditure shocks for countries for Scenario 
4 to 7. 
Table 8 – Shocks to government  expenditure 
Region S04 S05 S06 S07 
Argentina 0.39 0.98 1.76 0.39 
Australia 0.27 0.67 1.21 0.27 
Brazil 0.39 0.98 1.76 0.39 
Canada 0.26 0.66 1.19 0.26 
China 0.50 1.25 2.25 0.50 
France 0.30 0.74 1.34 0.30 
Germany 0.27 0.68 1.22 0.27 
India 0.52 1.30 2.34 0.52 
Indonesia 0.47 1.18 2.12 0.47 
Italy 0.34 0.84 1.51 0.34 
Japan 0.30 0.74 1.33 0.30 
Mexico 0.43 1.07 1.93 0.43 
Republic of Korea 0.31 0.79 1.41 0.31 
Russia 0.49 1.23 2.21 0.49 
Saudi Arabia 0.38 0.95 1.71 0.38 
South Africa 0.43 1.08 1.94 0.43 
Turkey 0.47 1.17 2.11 0.47 
United Kingdom 0.27 0.68 1.22 0.27 
United States of America 0.22 0.54 0.98 0.22 
Other Asia 0.39 0.99 1.77 0.39 
Other oil producing countries 0.54 1.35 2.42 0.54 
Rest of Euro Zone 0.33 0.81 1.46 0.33 
Rest of OECD 0.28 0.70 1.26 0.28 
Rest of the World 0.59 1.49 2.67 0.59 
 
5. Simulation Results 
(a) Baseline scenario 
We first solve the model from 2016 to 2100 with 2015 as the base year. The key inputs into the 
baseline are the initial dynamics from 2015 to 2016 and subsequent projections from 2016 
forward for labor-augmenting technological progress by sector and by country. The labor-
augmenting technology projections follow the approach of Barro (1991, 2015). Over long 
periods, Barro estimates that the average catchup rate of individual countries to the world-wide 
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productivity frontier is 2% per year. We use the Groningen Growth and Development database 
(2018) to estimate the initial level of productivity in each sector of each region in the model. 
Given this initial productivity, we then take the ratio of this to the equivalent sector in the US, 
which we assume is the frontier. Given this initial gap in sectoral productivity, we use the Barro 
catchup model to generate long term projections of the productivity growth rate of each sector 
within each country. Where we expect that regions will catch up more quickly to the frontier 
due to economic reforms (e.g., China) or more slowly to the frontier due to institutional 
rigidities (e.g., Russia), we vary the catchup rate over time. The calibration of the catchup rate 
attempts to replicate recent growth experiences of each country and region in the model. 
The exogenous sectoral productivity growth rate, together with the economy-wide growth in 
labor supply, are the exogenous drivers of sector growth for each country. The growth in the 
capital stock in each sector in each region is determined endogenously within the model. 
In the alternative COVID-19 scenarios, we incorporate the range of shocks discussed above to 
model the economic consequences of different epidemiological assumptions. All results below 
are the difference between the COVID-19 scenario and the baseline of the model. 
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(b) Results 
Table 9 contains the impact on populations in different regions. These are the core shocks 
that are combined with the various indicators above to create the seven scenarios. The 
mortality rates for each country under each scenario are contained in Table B-1 in Appendix 
B. Note that the mortality rates in Table B-1 are much lower in advanced economies 
compared to China. 
Table 9 – Impact on populations under each scenario 
Country/Region Population (Thousands) 
Mortality in First Year (Thousands) 
S01 S02 S03 S04 S05 S06 S07 
Argentina 43,418 - - - 50 126 226 50 
Australia 23,800 - - - 21 53 96 21 
Brazil 205,962 - - - 257 641 1,154 257 
Canada 35,950 - - - 30 74 133 30 
China 1,397,029 279 3,493 12,573 2,794 6,985 12,573 2,794 
France 64,457 - - - 60 149 268 60 
Germany 81,708 - - - 79 198 357 79 
India 1,309,054 - - - 3,693 9,232 16,617 3,693 
Indonesia 258,162 - - - 647 1,616 2,909 647 
Italy 59,504 - - - 59 147 265 59 
Japan 127,975 - - - 127 317 570 127 
Mexico 125,891 - - - 184 460 828 184 
Republic of Korea 50,594 - - - 61 151 272 61 
Russia 143,888 - - - 186 465 837 186 
Saudi Arabia 31,557 - - - 29 71 128 29 
South Africa 55,291 - - - 75 187 337 75 
Turkey 78,271 - - - 116 290 522 116 
United Kingdom 65,397 - - - 64 161 290 64 
United States of America 319,929 - - - 236 589 1,060 236 
Other Asia 330,935 - - - 530 1,324 2,384 530 
Other oil producing countries 517,452 - - - 774 1,936 3,485 774 
Rest of Euro Zone 117,427 - - - 106 265 478 106 
Rest of OECD 33,954 - - - 27 67 121 27 
Rest of the World 2,505,604 - - - 4,986 12,464 22,435 4,986 
Total 7,983,209 279 3,493 12,573 15,188 37,971 68,347 15,188 
 
Table 9 shows that for even the lowest of the pandemic scenarios (S04), there are estimated 
to be around 15 million deaths. In the United States, the estimate is 236,000 deaths. These 
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estimated deaths from COVID-19 can be compared to a regular influenza season in the 
United States, where around 55,000 people die each year. 
 
Table 10 - GDP loss in 2020 (% deviation from baseline) 
Country/Region S01 S02 S03 S04 S05 S06 S07 
AUS -0.3 -0.4 -0.7 -2.1 -4.6 -7.9 -2.0 
BRA -0.3 -0.3 -0.5 -2.1 -4.7 -8.0 -1.9 
CHI -0.4 -1.9 -6.0 -1.6 -3.6 -6.2 -2.2 
IND -0.2 -0.2 -0.4 -1.4 -3.1 -5.3 -1.3 
EUZ -0.2 -0.2 -0.4 -2.1 -4.8 -8.4 -1.9 
FRA -0.2 -0.3 -0.3 -2.0 -4.6 -8.0 -1.5 
DEU -0.2 -0.3 -0.5 -2.2 -5.0 -8.7 -1.7 
ZAF -0.2 -0.2 -0.4 -1.8 -4.0 -7.0 -1.5 
ITA -0.2 -0.3 -0.4 -2.1 -4.8 -8.3 -2.2 
JPN -0.3 -0.4 -0.5 -2.5 -5.7 -9.9 -2.0 
GBR -0.2 -0.2 -0.3 -1.5 -3.5 -6.0 -1.2 
ROW -0.2 -0.2 -0.3 -1.5 -3.5 -5.9 -1.5 
MEX -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.9 -2.2 -3.8 -0.9 
CAN -0.2 -0.2 -0.4 -1.8 -4.1 -7.1 -1.6 
OEC -0.3 -0.3 -0.5 -2.0 -4.4 -7.7 -1.8 
OPC -0.2 -0.2 -0.4 -1.4 -3.2 -5.5 -1.3 
ARG -0.2 -0.3 -0.5 -1.6 -3.5 -6.0 -1.2 
RUS -0.2 -0.3 -0.5 -2.0 -4.6 -8.0 -1.9 
SAU -0.2 -0.2 -0.3 -0.7 -1.4 -2.4 -1.3 
TUR -0.1 -0.2 -0.2 -1.4 -3.2 -5.5 -1.2 
USA -0.1 -0.1 -0.2 -2.0 -4.8 -8.4 -1.5 
OAS -0.1 -0.2 -0.4 -1.6 -3.6 -6.3 -1.5 
INO -0.2 -0.2 -0.3 -1.3 -2.8 -4.7 -1.3 
KOR -0.1 -0.2 -0.3 -1.4 -3.3 -5.8 -1.3 
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Tables 10 and 11 provide a summary of the overall GDP loss for each country/region under the 
seven scenarios. The results in Table 10 are the Change in GDP in 2020 expressed as a 
percentage change from the baseline. The results in Table 11 are the results from Table 10 
converted into billions of $2020US. 
Table 11 - GDP Loss in 2020 ($US billions) 
Country/Region S01 S02 S03 S04 S05 S06 S07 
AUS (4) (5) (9) (27) (60) (103) (27) 
BRA (9) (12) (19) (72) (161) (275) (65) 
CHI (95) (488) (1,564) (426) (946) (1,618) (560) 
IND (21) (26) (40) (152) (334) (567) (142) 
EUZ (11) (13) (19) (111) (256) (446) (101) 
FRA (7) (8) (11) (63) (144) (250) (46) 
DEU (11) (14) (21) (99) (225) (390) (78) 
ZAF (1) (2) (3) (14) (33) (57) (12) 
ITA (6) (7) (9) (54) (123) (214) (56) 
JPN (17) (20) (28) (140) (318) (549) (113) 
GBR (5) (6) (9) (48) (108) (187) (39) 
ROW (24) (29) (43) (234) (529) (906) (227) 
MEX (2) (2) (3) (24) (57) (98) (24) 
CAN (3) (4) (6) (32) (74) (128) (28) 
OEC (5) (6) (10) (40) (91) (157) (36) 
OPC (10) (12) (18) (73) (164) (282) (69) 
ARG (2) (3) (5) (15) (33) (56) (11) 
RUS (10) (12) (19) (84) (191) (331) (81) 
SAU (3) (3) (5) (12) (24) (40) (22) 
TUR (3) (4) (6) (33) (75) (130) (30) 
USA (16) (22) (40) (420) (1,004) (1,769) (314) 
OAS (6) (10) (19) (80) (186) (324) (77) 
INO (6) (7) (11) (45) (99) (167) (46) 
KOR (3) (4) (7) (31) (71) (124) (29) 
Total Change (USD 
Billion) (283) (720) (1,922) (2,330) (5,305) (9,170) (2,230) 
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Tables 10 and 11 illustrate the scale of the various pandemic scenarios on reducing GDP in 
the global economy. Even a low-end pandemic modeled on the Hong Kong Flu is expected to 
reduce global GDP by around $SU2.4 trillion and a more serious outbreak similar to the 
Spanish flu reduces global GDP by over $US9trillion in 2020. 
Figures 9-11 provide the time profile of the results for several countries. The patterns in the 
figures represents the nature of the assumed shocks which for the first 6 scenarios are 
expected to disappear over time, Figure 9 contains results for China under each scenario. We 
present results for Real GDP, private investment, consumption, the trade balance and then the 
short real interest rate and the value of the equity market for sector 5 which is durable 
manufacturing. Figure 10 contains the results for the United States and Figure 11 for 
Australia. 
The shocks which make up the pandemic cause a sharp drop in consumption and investment. 
The decline in aggregate demand, together with the original risk shocks cause a sharp drop in 
equity markets. The funds from equity markets are partly shifted into bonds, partly into cash 
and partly overseas depending on which markets are most affected. Central banks respond by 
cutting interest rates which drive together with the increased demand for bonds from the 
portfolio shift drives down the real interest rate. Equity markets drop sharply both because of 
the rise in risk but also because of the expected economic slowdown and the fall in expected 
profits. For each scenario, there is a V shape recovery except for scenario 7. Recall that 
scenario 7 is the same as scenario 4 in year 1, but with the expectation that the pandemic will 
recur each year into the future.  
Similar patterns can be seen in the dynamic results for the United States and Australia shown 
in Figures 10 an 11. The quantitative magnitudes differ across countries, but the pattern of a 
sharp shock followed by a gradual recovery is common across countries. The improvement in 
the trade balance of China and deterioration in the US trade balance reflect the global 
reallocation of financial capital as a result of the shock. Capital flows out of severely affected 
economies like China and other developing and emerging economies and into safer advanced 
economies like the United States, Europe and Australia. This movement of capital tends to 
appreciate the exchange rate of countries that are receiving capital and depreciate the 
exchange rates of countries that are losing capital. The deprecation of the exchange rate 
increases exports and reduced imports in the countries losing capital and hence lead to the 
current account adjustment that is consistent with the capital account adjustment. 
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These results are very sensitive to the assumptions in the model, to the shocks we feed in and 
to the assumed macroeconomic policy responses in each country. Central banks are assumed 
to respond according to a Henderson-Mckibbin-Taylor rule which differs across countries 
(see Mckibbin and Triggs (2018)). Fiscal authorities are allowing automatic stabilizers to 
increase budget deficits but cover addition debt servicing costs with a lump-sum tax levied on 
households over time. In addition, there is the fiscal spending increase assumed in the shock 
design outlined above. 
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6. Conclusions and Policy Implications 
This paper has presented some preliminary estimates of the cost of the COVID-19 outbreak 
under seven different scenarios of how the disease might evolve. The goal is not to be definitive 
about the virus outbreak, but rather to provide information about a range of possible economic 
costs of the disease. At the time of writing this paper, the probability of any of these scenarios 
and the range of plausible alternatives are highly uncertain. In the case where COVID-19 
develops into a global pandemic, our results suggest that the cost can escalate quickly. 
A range of policy responses will be required both in the short term as well as in the coming 
years. In the short term, central banks and Treasuries need to make sure that disrupted 
economies continue to function while the disease outbreak continues. In the face of real and 
financial stress, there is a critical role for governments. While cutting interest rates is a possible 
response for central banks, the shock is not only a demand management problem but a multi-
faceted crisis that will require monetary, fiscal and health policy responses. Quarantining 
affected people and reducing large scale social interaction is an effective response. Wide 
dissemination of good hygiene practices as outlined in Levine and McKibbin (2020) can be a 
low cost and highly effective response that can reduce the extent of contagion and therefore 
reduce the social and economic cost. 
The longer-term responses are even more important. Despite the potential loss of life and the 
possible large-scale disruption to a large number of people, many governments have been 
reluctant to invest sufficiently in their health care systems, let alone public health systems in 
less developed countries where many infectious diseases are likely to originate. Experts have 
warned and continue to warn that zoonotic diseases will continue to pose a threat to the lives 
of millions of people with potentially major disruption to an integrated world economy. The 
idea that any country can be an island in an integrated global economy is proven wrong by the 
latest outbreak of COVID-19. Global cooperation, especially in the sphere of public health and 
economic development, is essential. All major countries need to participate actively. It is too 
late to act once the disease has taken hold in many other countries and attempt to close borders 
once a pandemic has started. 
Poverty kills poor people, but the outbreak of COVID-19 shows that if diseases are generated 
in poor countries due to overcrowding, poor public health and interaction with wild animals,  
these diseases can kill people of any socioeconomic group in any society. There needs to be 
vastly more investment in public health and development in the richest but also, and especially, 
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in the poorest countries. This study indicates the possible costs that can be avoided through 
global cooperative investment in public health in all countries. We have known this critical 
policy intervention for decades, yet politicians continue to ignore the scientific evidence on the 
role of public health in improving the quality of life and as a driver of economic growth.  
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Figure 3 - Index of Governance 
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Figure 7 - Index of Sector Exposure to Exposed Activities 
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Figure 8: Dynamic Results for China  
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Figure 8 (continued): Dynamic Results for China 
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Figure 9: Dynamic Results for the United States  
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Figure 9 (continued): Dynamic Results for the United States   
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Figure 10: Dynamic Results for Australia  
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Figure 10 (continued): Dynamic Results for Australia 
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Appendix A. G-Cubed Regions 
Version G20 (6) 
 
United States 
Japan 
Germany 
United Kingdom 
France 
Italy 
Rest of Euro Zone 
Canada 
Australia 
Rest of Advanced Economies 
Korea 
Turkey 
China 
India 
Indonesia 
Other Asia 
Mexico 
Argentina 
Brazil 
Russia 
Saudi Arabia 
South Africa 
Oil-exporting and the Middle East 
Rest of World 
 
 
Rest of Euro Zone: 
Spain, Netherlands, Belgium, Luxemburg, Ireland, Greece, Portugal, Finland, Cyprus, Malta, 
Slovakia, Slovenia, Estonia 
 
Rest of Advanced Economies: 
New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, Iceland, Denmark, Iceland, Liechtenstein 
 
Oil-exporting and the Middle East: 
Ecuador, Nigeria, Angola, Congo, Iran, Venezuela, Algeria, Libya, Bahrain, Iraq, Israel, 
Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Palestinian Territory, Oman, Qatar, Syrian Arab Republic, United 
Arab Emirates, Yemen 
 
Other Asia: 
Singapore, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand, Vietnam 
 
Rest of World: 
All countries not included in other groups. 
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Appendix B: Additional results 
 
Table B-112 - Mortality Rates for each Country under each Scenario 
Country/Region Mortality Rate 
S01 S02 S03 S04 S05 S06 S07 
Argentina                     -                 -                 -    0.12% 0.29% 0.52% 0.12% 
Australia                     -                 -                 -    0.09% 0.22% 0.40% 0.09% 
Brazil                     -                 -                 -    0.12% 0.31% 0.56% 0.12% 
Canada                     -                 -                 -    0.08% 0.21% 0.37% 0.08% 
China 0.02% 0.25% 0.90% 0.20% 0.50% 0.90% 0.20% 
France                     -                 -                 -    0.09% 0.23% 0.42% 0.09% 
Germany                     -                 -                 -    0.10% 0.24% 0.44% 0.10% 
India                     -                 -                 -    0.28% 0.71% 1.27% 0.28% 
Indonesia                     -                 -                 -    0.25% 0.63% 1.13% 0.25% 
Italy                     -                 -                 -    0.10% 0.25% 0.45% 0.10% 
Japan                     -                 -                 -    0.10% 0.25% 0.45% 0.10% 
Mexico                     -                 -                 -    0.15% 0.37% 0.66% 0.15% 
Republic of Korea                     -                 -                 -    0.12% 0.30% 0.54% 0.12% 
Russia                     -                 -                 -    0.13% 0.32% 0.58% 0.13% 
Saudi Arabia                     -                 -                 -    0.09% 0.23% 0.41% 0.09% 
South Africa                     -                 -                 -    0.14% 0.34% 0.61% 0.14% 
Turkey                     -                 -                 -    0.15% 0.37% 0.67% 0.15% 
United Kingdom                     -                 -                 -    0.10% 0.25% 0.44% 0.10% 
United States of America                     -                 -                 -    0.07% 0.18% 0.33% 0.07% 
Other Asia                     -                 -                 -    0.16% 0.40% 0.72% 0.16% 
Other oil producing 
countries                     -                 -                 -    0.15% 0.37% 0.67% 0.15% 
Rest of Euro Zone                     -                 -                 -    0.09% 0.23% 0.41% 0.09% 
Rest of OECD                     -                 -                 -    0.08% 0.20% 0.36% 0.08% 
Rest of the World                     -                 -                 -    0.20% 0.50% 0.90% 0.20% 
 
 
 
This preprint research paper has not been peer reviewed. Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3547729
